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On the Performance Analysis of IDLP and
SpaceMac for Network Coding-enabled Mobile
Small Cells
Reza Parsamehr, Member, IEEE, Georgios Mantas, Member, IEEE, Jonathan Rodriguez, Senior Member, IEEE,
and José-Fernán Martı́nez-Ortega, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Network coding (NC)-enabled mobile small cells
are observed as a promising technology for 5G networks in
a cost-effective and energy-efficient manner. The NC-enabled
environment suffers from pollution attacks where malicious
intermediate nodes manipulate packets in transition. Detecting
the polluted packets as well as identifying the exact location of
malicious users are equally important tasks for these networks.
SpaceMac [1] is one of the most competitive mechanisms in
the literature for detecting pollution attacks and identifying the
exact location of attackers in RLNC. In this paper, we compare
SpaceMac with the IDLP mechanism presented in [2]. Both
mechanisms have been implemented in KODO and they are
compared in terms of computational complexity, computational
overhead, communication overhead and decoding probability.
The performance evaluation results demonstrated that IDLP is
more efficient than SpaceMac while at the same time is more
secure as shown through the security analysis part in this paper.
Index Terms—Network coding, pollution attacks, intrusion
detection, location-aware prevention, 5G.
I. INTRODUCTION
Network coding (NC) is a promising solution for increasing
the throughput and improving the performance of the wireless
network in Mobile Small Cells (MSC). However, despite the
outstanding benefits of NC technology, this technology is
susceptible to pollution attacks which are one of the most
severe security threats for NC-enable MSC [3]. Thus, detection
of the pollution attacks and the exact location of attackers are
important for intrusion detection and location-aware mecha-
nisms in NC-enabled MSC. Although there are many schemes
against pollution attacks [4]–[10], there are only few focusing
on identifying the location of malicious users [1], [2], [11]–
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SpaceMac mechanism, presented by Le et al. in [1], is
one of the most competitive mechanisms in the literature for
detecting pollution attacks and identifying the exact location of
attackers in RLNC. In this paper, we compare the IDLP mech-
anism presented by Parsamehr et al. in [2] with SpaceMac in
terms of computational complexity, computational overhead,
communication overhead and decoding probability. In order to
evaluate and compare IDLP with SpaceMac, we implemented
both mechanisms on KODO. The performance evaluation and
the security analysis show that IDLP is more efficient and
secure than SpaceMac.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II out-
lines the IDLP mechanism [2] and SpaceMace mechanism [1].
In section III, the two main security weaknesses of SpaceMac
are presented. In Section IV, the performance evaluation and
comparison of IDLP and SpaceMac are given. Finally, Section
V concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
In the following section, ”IDLP: An Efficient Intrusion
Detection and Location-aware Prevention Mechanism for Net-
work Coding-enabled Mobile Small Cells” [2], and ”Cooper-
ative Defense Against Pollution Attacks in Network Coding
Using SpaceMac” [1] will be briefly summarized.
A. IDLP: An Efficient Intrusion Detection and Location-aware
Prevention Mechanism for NC-enabled Mobile Small Cells
The IDLP involves a locating scheme and detection scheme
both being founded on the basis of null space homomorphic
MAC scheme [5] and they are described in following sections.
This mechanism is divided into two phases for improving its
effectiveness with regard to the consumption of resources;
• Phase 1: identifying the MSC where pollution attack
happend. In the first step, all Relay Destination Nodes
(DNs) and Nodes (RNs) are given a detection scheme
belonging to IDLP mechanism. When a pollution attack
is detected by an RN or DN, they drop the polluted
packet, and send a report to the Hotspots of the Mobile
Small Cells (MSCs) where the reporter belongs to and the
Hotspot will forward the report to the SDN Controller,
being in charge of MSC identification where in the
location which a pollution attack ensued according to the
reports that were received.
• Phase 2: Identifying the location of adversary node in
the MSC that has been polluted. All mobile devices
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in the spotted MSC that has been polluted in phase1
are given the locating and detection scheme. Once a
mobile device in MSC that has been polluted detects any
pollution, the mobile device will drop the polluted packet
and will send a report according to locating scheme
towards the Hotspot. Then the report will be sent to
the SDN controller by the Hotspot to select the best
suitable preventive measure (e.g., preventing adversary
mobile device(s) from gaining access to the network).
Otherwise, an expanded coded packet will be created
which is established on the basis of the received coded
packet and the key that is shared between them and SDN
controller. They will send this expanded coded packet to
the next node and Hotspot as well.
1) Detection Scheme: According to [7] and [5], in the
detection scheme of IDLP, the message is separated into a
generation of native packet represented as b1, b2, ..., bm by the
SN, in which m is the size of the generation and each of the
packets bi is composed of n symbols (i.e., bi,1,bi,2, ...,bi,n)
which are located in the finite field Fnp . Therefore, a coded
packet bi will be created by the source node based on (1) and
will direct it to the next mobile devices.
bi = (
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0,bi,1, · · · ,bi,n) ∈ Fm+np (1)
For simplicity, (1) can also be written as follows:
bi = (bi,1, · · · ,bi,m+n) ∈ Fm+np (2)
As shown in (3), each intermediate node generates a fresh
coded packet x being a linear combination of h received coded
packets (b1, b2, . . . , bh) and refers it to its neighbors. βi is
coding coefficient which is chosen randomly from Fp and all





The L tags are created according to null space properties
[14] by the SN, in order to detect pollution attacks. The five
steps below are applied in order to create the tags in addition to
verification of the orthogonality of the received coded packets:
1) Distribution of the keys to the source node: A set of keys
(C1,C2, ...,CL) are send out by key distribution center in
the finite field Fm+n+Lp and which are distributed in the
source node.
2) The L tags (i.e., t1, t2, ..., tL) are created by L keys for
each coded packet by the SN, as stated by (4). Each
coded packet is comprises m+n symbols, as well as L



























3) With the aim of avoiding tag pollution attacks, the L tags
are swapped on the basis of the secret key (SV) that is
shared between the DNs and SNs, as stated by (5).
bi = Swap(bi)SV (5)
4) A set of new keys are prodused by KDC center through
the use of the swapping vector SV and according to the
key set that was sent towards the SN during step 1 as
stated in (6). Next, the keys are forwarded to the DNs




i = Swap(Ci)SV (6)
5) Lastly, the received coded packet is verified by each DN
and intermediate node according to following equation:







If δ = 0, then the received coded packet is confirmed
and suitable for transmission to the next nodes. If not,
it is dropped.
2) Locating Scheme: The adversary mobile node’s precise
location within the MSC that has been polluted is recognized
by locating scheme. In this step, each of the mobile nodes
is accountable for: a) generating a coded packet which is
expanded and on the basis of the received coded packet, in
addition to sending it to the Hotspot and next node, then b)
reporting Hotspot as soon as a polluted packet is detected by
the detection scheme within polluted MSC. Both the report
and the expanded coded packet are forwarded to the SDN
Controller being in charge of recognizing the adversary mobile
nide’s precise location.
• Expanded Coded Packet: An additional tag is added to
each coded packet by each of the intermediate node with
the aim of verifying itself to the SDN Controller. This
tag is calculated on the basis of the pre-distributed share
key between the SDN Controller and each node. This tag




























is the pre-shared key sent out by the KDC, and si is the
properly calculated tag.
The received expanded coded packet {bi||tSN||si} is
confirmed by the SDN controller based on the following
formula. Where bi represents the coded packet, tSN is
the set of tags which appeded by SN, and si is the tag
which appended by the given intermediate node. If δ = 0
Authorized licensed use limited to: b-on: UNIVERSIDADE DE AVEIRO. Downloaded on October 02,2020 at 16:25:05 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
1089-7798 (c) 2020 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/LCOMM.2020.3027972, IEEE
Communications Letters
3




C”i,j ∗ {bi,j ‖ tSN ‖ si} (9)
• report
When a signed polluted packet (e) by the previous mobile
device’s key ({e||si−1}) is detected, a report is generated
by the intermediate node or a DN, who detects pollution.
The generated report is the received polluted packet
({e||si−1}) signed by the given node and is represented
as {e||si−1||si}.
In the following equation if δ = 0, then the SDN




C”i,j ∗ {e ‖ si−1 ‖ si} (10)
Therefore, the signature of the adversary node (si−1) is




C”i,j ∗ {e ‖ si−1} (11)
B. Cooperative Defense Against Pollution Attacks in Network
Coding Using SpaceMac
In [1] the authors plan a cooperative defense system in-
cluding both locating and detection schemes, with SpaceMac
being their building block inspired from [4] and [11]. In this
scenario, there is S which is a source node, some receivers
R and some intermediate nodes denoted by I. A generation
is composed of m packets, v̄1, v̄2, ..., v̄m in finite field Fnp .
Then the source node generates a coded packet vi according
to following equation and refers it to the intermediate nodes.
vi = (−v̄1−,
m︷ ︸︸ ︷
0, · · · , 0︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−1
, 1, 0, · · · , 0) ∈ Fm+np (12)
The packet y stand as a linear combination of the packets
vi’s. Represent the subspace spanned by vi’s by ΠS ⊆ Fn+mp .
Here, ΠS is denoted as the source space.
The HomMac scheme suggested in [4] is described with
three algorithms: Mac, Combine, and Verify.
• A tag is produced by the Mac algorithm for a given vector
getting a secret key k, the identifier id of the source space
ΠS, as well as a vector y ∈ Fm+nq as input and generates
tag t for y.
• The Combine algorithm gets p vectors y1, . . . ,yp, their
tags t1, . . . , tp under key k, and their coefficients
α1, . . . ,αp ∈ Fq as inputs and calculates a tag t for a lin-
ear combination of some given vectors y def= Σpi=1αiyi.
• The tag is confirmed by Verify algorithm through receiv-
ing a secret key k, the identifier id of the source space
ΠS, a vector y ∈ Fm+nq , and its tag t as input and giving
0 (reject) or 1 (accept) as an output.
1) Detection Scheme: In the detection scheme, an interme-
diate node N receives some coded packet from its parents and
sends out a recoded packet y to its children and it must be
y ∈ ΠN(t) or else, y is corrupted (ΠN(t) represents the space
covered by all the packets that node N receives from all its
parents until time (t)). Hence, in the SpaceMac the parents
of N are allowed to sign ΠN and N’s children are allowed
to verify if the received packet from N belongs to ΠN. This
cooperation of N’s parents and its children, makes it possible
for children to detect any polluted packet sent by N.
There is a controller in this scheme. The controller knows
the whole topology of the graph and each node N shares a
pair of secret keys (k1N,k
2
N) with the controller which can
be recognized with a public key infrastructure. The controller
defines the key kN̄ for every intermediate nodeN. When using
SpaceMac, the parents and children of N utilize this key and it
is not known to N itself. Each node necessarily should know
a dissimilar set of keys in order to contribute in the detection
scheme according to its position in the network, since it can
serve as either a parent or a child. Next, all the receivers and
the source must share k∗, an end-to-end key. The key is used to
guarantee detection in the company of colluding adversaries,
where a node N colludes with its parent to gain kN̄ and
therefore will be able to bypass its children’s verification.
Firstly, an end-to-end tag tK
∗
vi
is calculated by source S,




= Mac(vi, k∗). Source node attaches the created end to






instead of vi. The MAC tag, t
kN̄
y , is calculated by P by using
Mac, under key kN̄ : t
kN̄
y =Mac(y, kN̄) if P as a parent of N
wants to send a packet y to its child N. In addition, the helper
tag, P must also pass along a verification tag of y, which is
used by N to confirm the integrity of y. The node uses kP̄
to verify the integrity of the packet, when a node N receives
a packet {tkN̄y ||t
kP̄
y ||y} from its parent P. As can be seen in
the Verify algorithm, if Verify (kP̄,y, t
kP̄
y ) = 1 the packet is
assumed to be non-corrupted. So, if N receives a corrupted
packet from P, the attack is instantly detected by N. If N is
a receiver, then it will additionaly verifies the end-to-end tag
using key k∗.
2) Locating Scheme: Each intermediate node cooperates
with the controller through this scheme, by signing the space
that is spanned by the packets which it refers to the next node
using SpaceMac. Therefore, when the attacker as the next node
gives a report a fake space to the controller, it will not have
the appropriate signature of the fake space to convince the
controller.
According to locating scheme proposed in [14] and [20],
node N reports a arbitrarily chosen packet, yr, of the space ΠPN
which is a received subspace from a parent P. The controller
though checking whether yr ∈ ΠS can recognize if the edges
are polluted or not (e.g., ΠPN ⊆ ΠS).
Based on Mac algorithm in SpaceMac, P generates a tag tyi
with a sectert key shared by controller, when it wants needs
to send packet yi to N. When N reports yr to the controller,
the generated tag using the Combine algorithm for yr is valid
on the condition yr is a linear combination of packets that
it received from P. If yr is not a linear combination of yi’s




They utilize a non-repudiation transmission protocol pro-
posed by Wang et al. [12] with the aim of not allowing
a malicious nodes to send invalid tags to their children to
stop the children from giving a report about polluted space.
This mechanism can accurately locate the attacker after the
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Fig. 1. Scenario Architecture
controller gathers the true subspaces from all nodes, and stops
nodes from lying.
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The two main security weaknesses of SpaceMac, compared
to IDLP, are presented in this section. We consider the follow-
ing two scenarios:
• Scenario A – One attacker: Both mechanisms detect the
polluted packets in each intermediate node and identify
the exact location of the compromised node. However, in
SpaceMac, if an external attacker injects a polluted packet
to the nodes in the first level of intermediate nodes (i.e.,
the children of the source node), the intermediate node
could not detect it because there is no verification tag
for intermediate nodes in the first level. This pollution is
detectable in the next level. In the contrary, IDLP detects
all the polluted packets in the first level.
• Scenario B – Two or more attackers in a row: In
SpaceMac, when there are two or more attackers in a
row and node N colludes with its parent to obtain kN̄,
the polluted packet can bypass the verification at the
children of node N. However, there is the key, k∗, to
use for ensuring pollution detection in destination nodes,
but SpaceMac cannot identify the exact location of the
attackers in a row and therefore, the pollution distribute
through the network. Thus, the destination nodes receive
the polluted packets and drop them. While IDLP does not
only detect and drop the polluted packet but also identifies
the exact location of the attackers in a row.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, the IDLP and the SpaceMac mechanisms
are compared. First of all, as shown in Fig. 1, three butterfly
topologies, including 18 normal nodes and one adversary node
are implemented. The adversary node is considered at a fixed
position, the probability that the adversary node pollutes a
relayed packet is 1 and the pollution scheme is continuous. The
implementation is based on RLNC approach of the Network
Coding library of KODO [15], [16]. In this implementation,
the packets, the required keys, and their proper tags at the
intermediate and nodes source node are generated by Matlab.
Then, the generated packets, keys and tags are included
manually in KODO so as to achieve the desired functionality
of the implemented scenario on KODO.
The packet generation size is 64 symbols and the symbol
size is set between 1, 000 to 10, 000 bytes. For IDLP, the value
of L (i.e., number of tags) can be 27, 42, or 54 [14]. However,
for SpaceMac the value of L is always 1. The Galois field in
use is GF(28). In the whole implementation, the machine used
for running has the following characteristics: a 2.7GHz Core
i7 CPU with 8GB of physical memory.
In this section, the performance evaluation and the compari-
son of the proposed IDLP, and SpaceMac are provided in terms
of computational complexity and overhead, communication
overhead, and decoding probability when there is one attacker.
1) Computational Overhead: The total time elapsed from
the time that the packet is generated to the time that the
destination nodes verify and decode the received packet, and
it is given by the following equation:
Ttotal = Tenc + Trec + Tdec + Tver (13)
In this equation, Tenc is the encoding time at the source
node, Trec is the recoding time at each intermediate node,
Tdec is the decoding time at the destination node, and Tver is
the verifying time at the intermediate and destination nodes.
The Ttotal, for IDLP and SpaceMac are illustrated in Fig. 2.
As shown, by increasing the number of tags in IDLP, the
Ttotal increases as well. However, the Ttotal of IDLP is
still less than the Ttotal of SpaceMac because in IDLP the
detection and locating schemes are not applied to all mobile
devices in order to protect the NC-enabled mobile small cells
from the depletion of their resources.
Additionally, regarding the verification time (see Fig. 3), as
mentioned before in SpaceMac, in each round, each parent P
of N creates a new tag for each child of N and appends it
to the coded packet to facilitate the detection of any pollution
that might be created by nodeN. These operations are repeated
for all the intermediate nodes. Therefore, if each parent P has
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IDLP: L = 27
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Fig. 2. The Ttotal for different number of tags in
IDLP and SpaceMac


















IDLP: L = 27
IDLP: L = 42
IDLP: L = 54
SpaceMac: L = 1
Fig. 3. The Tver for different number of tags in
IDLP and SpaceMac














IDLP: L = 27
IDLP: L = 42
IDLP: L = 54
SpaceMac: L = 1
Fig. 4. The Tcomm for different number of tags
in IDLP and SpaceMac
f children in average (e.g., N1, . . . ,Nf), node P must create
f2 tags for each coded packets. In the case of an extensive
network that has h intermediate nodes, the complexity of
SpaceMac reaches to O(h× f2). It is worthwhile to mention
that these operations are happening even if there is no attack
in the network. While in IDLP, if there is no attack in the
network, IDLP does not create any extra tag in intermediate
nodes. As it is described in section II, if the RNs or DNs detect
any pollution, IDLP creates an extra tag in each intermediate
node. This tag is only created within the area of a polluted
MSC, which is already detected by the SDN controller. Since
it is assumed that the number of mobile devices in each MSC
is constant, the complexity of IDLP is O(c) (See table I).
2) communicational Overhead: The communication over-
head (Tcomm) of IDLP and SpaceMac is defined as follows:
Tcomm = Ttotal − Tver (14)
Fig. 4 shows that the Tcomm of SpaceMac and IDLP for
27 tags is almost the same. However, the Tcomm of IDLP
for 42 and 54 tags is more than the Tcomm of SpaceMac.
The difference is due to the fact that the length of the coded
packets, sent through the network based on IDLP, is larger
than the length of the coded packets sent through the network
based on the SpaceMac.
3) Decoding Probability: The Pr is defined as the proba-
bility that a corrupted packet is not detected in the verification
phase. According to our implementation results, when there is
one attacker the Pr is almost 0 for both IDLP and SpaceMac.
This is because when there is one attacker and IDLP or
SpaceMac are applied, the adversary does not have any chance
to distribute the corrupted packet in the network due to the fact
that the detected adversaries are blocked from access to the
network.
However, when there are two or more adversaries in a row,
the Pr of IDLP is still 0, since IDLP blocks the attackers after
detection, but the Pr of SpaceMac is 1 because SpaceMac
cannot identify the exact location of the attackers and block
them even after detection at the destination nodes.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we compared IDLP with SpaceMac which is
one of the most competitive mechanisms in the literature for
detecting pollution attacks and identifying the exact location of
attackers in RLNC. Both mechanisms have been implemented
in KODO and they are compared in terms of computational
complexity, computational overhead, communication overhead
and decoding probability. The performance evaluation results
demonstrated that IDLP is more efficient than SpaceMac while
at the same time is more secure as shown through the security
analysis in Section III.
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